

# Attribute-based Credentials and Partial Identities for a more Privacy Friendly Internet

Ochrana dát a súkromia v cloudových službách (Normy & technológie pre riadenie a IT prevádzku)

Bratislava

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# Agenda

- Some Privacy Problems in Identity Management and Assurance
  - Identity Management and Overidentification
  - Identity Assurance and the “Calling Home” Problem
- Attribute Based Credentials
- The ABC4Trust Project
  - The Trials
  - The Architecture
  - ABC4Trust in Perspective
- Mobile Platforms & Privacy-ABCs
- Conclusions & Outlook

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
# Identity Management (IdM)

## An early approach


- „Fear not, for I have redeemed you;  
I have called you by name: you are mine.”  
[Isaiah 43:1]
- „Neboj sa, ja som t'a vykúpil,  
povolal som t'a tvojím menom, si môj.”  
[Izaiáš 43:1]
- „Μη φοβου· διοτι εγω σε ελυτρωσα,  
σε εκαλεσα με το ονομα σου· εμου εισαι“  
[Ησαιαν 43:1]
- „No temas, porque yo te he redimido,  
te he llamado por tu nombre; mío eres tú.”  
[Isaías 43<sup>1</sup>]
- „Fürchte dich nicht, denn ich habe dich erlöst;  
ich habe dich bei deinem Namen gerufen; du bist mein!“  
[Jesaja 43,1]



# Typical federated architecture for Identity Management (IdM)



# Privacy (and security) issues of typical federated IdM architectures



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# Identity Management and Overidentification

Identity Service Provider (IdSP)




Relying Party (RP)



trust

RP gets to know values of the tokens and thus too much of the user's identity.







# Identity Management (IdM)

## 2 sides of a medal with enormous economic potential

ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27/WG 5 Identity Management & Privacy Technologies

- **Organisations** aim to sort out

- User Accounts in different IT systems
- Authentication
- Rights management
- Access control

- **Unified identities** help to

- ease administration
- manage customer relations

- **Identity management systems**

- ease single-sign-on by unified accounts
- solve the problems of multiple passwords

- **People** live their life

- in different roles (professional, private, volunteer)
- using different identities (pseudonyms): email accounts, SIM cards, eBay trade names, chat names, 2ndLife names, ...)

- **Differentiated identities** help to

- protect
  - privacy, especially anonymity
  - personal security/safety
- enable reputation building at the same time

- **Identity management systems**

- support users using role based identities
- help to present the “right” identity in the right context



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
help to

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
# Partial Identities needed



# Agenda


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# The "Calling Home" Problem




# Identity Assurance


## 4 Entities and multiple names



# The 4 Entities and their relations




# The “Identity Provider” Model “Calling Home”





# STORK European eID PEPS

## Triple “Calling Home”



# Agenda


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# Attribute Based Credentials (privacy-ABCs)

- Certifying **relevant attributes**
- Token issuance and presentation **unlinkable**
  - Rather “coins” (that cannot be distinguished) than “bank notes” (that have a serial number)
- Users can disclose (minimal) **subsets** of the encoded **claims**
  - To respond to unanticipated requests of RPs
  - Without invalidating the token integrity
  - E.g. Certificate for birth date -> Claim for being over 21
- Two major **approaches** and **technologies**
  - U-Prove (Credentica -> Microsoft)
  - Idemix (IBM)

# Two approaches for privacy-ABCs


## Blind Signatures



## U-Prove

Brands, Paquin et al.  
Discrete Logs, RSA,...

## Zero-Knowledge Proofs



## Idemix (Identity Mixer)

Damgard, Camenisch & Lysyanskaya  
Strong RSA, pairings (LMRS, q-SDH)




# Identity Definition in ISO/IEC IS 24760-1:2011 to reduce the risk of overidentification

ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27/WG 5 Identity Management & Privacy Technologies

- **Identity** (partial identity):
  - Set of **attributes** related to an **entity**
  - From “A Framework for Identity Management” (ISO/IEC 24760)
    - Part 1: Terminology and concepts (IS:2011)
    - Part 2: Reference framework and requirements (WD)
    - Part 3: Practice (WD)

# Partial Identities

ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27/WG 5 Identity Management & Privacy Technologies



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
# ABC4Trust Objectives

- A common, unified architecture for ABC systems to enable
  - Comparing their respective features
  - Combining them on common platforms
  - “Lock-In” free usage of ABC systems
- Open reference implementations of selected ABC systems
- Deployments in actual production enabling
  - Minimal disclosure
  - Provision of anonymous feedback to a community to one is accredited as a member
- Relevant Standards
  - e.g. in ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27/WG 5  
“Identity Management and Privacy Technologies”





# ABC4Trust Partners



Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, DE

Alexandra Institute AS, DK

Research Academic Computer Technology Institute, GR

IBM Research - Zurich, CH

Miracle A/S, DK

NSN Management International GmbH, DE

Technische Universität Darmstadt, DE

Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz, DE


Eurodocs AB, SE

CryptoExperts SAS, FR

Microsoft NV, BE

Söderhamn Kommun, SE

# Project Workflow



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# ABC4Trust Pilot Trial: Community Interaction



Norrtullskolan School  
Söderhamn, Sweden

- School internal social network for communication among pupils, teachers, and personnel
- Provide trusted authentication while protecting anonymity
- Usability: make privacy technology understandable for non-technical users (e.g. pupils)

# ABC4Trust Pilot Trial: Course Rating



Computer Technology Institute  
Patras, Greece

- Course ratings conducted anonymously without lecturers knowing participants' identities
- Conduct polls based on attendance
- Issue multiple credentials (student cards, class attendance)
- Verify with anonymous proofs towards “untrusted” infrastructure

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# The ABC4Trust Architecture Objectives

- Abstraction of concepts of privacy-ABCs & unification of features
- A common unified architecture
  - That is independent of the specific technologies
  - Federation of privacy-ABC Systems based on different technologies
  - Interoperability between different privacy-ABC technologies
- Avoid technology lock-in
- Raise trust in privacy-ABC technologies
- Users will be able to
  - obtain credentials for many privacy-ABC technologies and
  - use them on the same hardware and software platforms
  - without having to consider which privacy-ABC technology has been used.
- Service providers and Identity Service Providers will be able to
  - adopt whatever privacy-ABC technology best suits their needs.

# The ABC4Trust Architecture

- Entities and Interactions
- High-level features and concepts of privacy-ABCs
- System architecture and components for handling privacy-ABCs
- Component APIs
- XML specification of all data formats




# The ABC4Trust Architecture Elements

- **Entities and Interactions**
- **High-level features and concepts of privacy-ABCs**
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# The ABC4Trust Architecture Elements

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# Entities and Interactions



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
# Features and concepts

- Credentials
  - List of attributes, encoding, etc.
- Presentation policies, presentation tokens
- User binding and device binding
- Issuance policies
- Pseudonyms
  - Verifiable, certified, scope-exclusive
- Inspection + revocation

# Features and concepts

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# Presentation



## ■ Presentation policy

- Which (combination of) credentials from which issuer
- Which attributes or attribute predicates to reveal

## ■ Presentation token

- *Description*: mechanism-agnostic revealed information
- *Evidence*: mechanism-specific crypto blobs
- Untraceable and unlinkable by default, traceable and linkable when so desired

# Presentation policy

```
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2
3 <PresentationPolicyAlternatives xmlns="http://abc4trust.eu/wp2/abcschemav1.0"
4   xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
5   xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
6   xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc"
7   xsi:schemaLocation="http://abc4trust.eu/wp2/abcschemav1.0 schema.xsd"
8   Version="1.0">
9 <PresentationPolicy PolicyUID="policy1" EnforceSameUserBinding="true" EnforceSameDeviceBinding="false">
10
11   <Message>
12     <Nonce>aDk3UEMzOTNjOTl1cmZHQ210U0c=</Nonce>
13   </Message>
14   <Pseudonym Alias="nym" Scope="http://sweden.gov/poll0105" Exclusive="true"/>
15   <Credential Alias="id">
16     <CredentialSpecAlternatives>
17       <CredentialSpecUID>urn:sweden:id</CredentialSpecUID>
18     </CredentialSpecAlternatives>
19     <IssuerAlternatives>
20       <IssuerParametersUID>urn:sweden:id:issuer</IssuerParametersUID>
21     </IssuerAlternatives>
22     <DisclosedAttribute AttributeType="urn:sweden:id:city"/>
23   </Credential>
24   <AttributePredicate Function="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:date-less-than">
25     <Attribute CredentialAlias="id" AttributeType="urn:sweden:id:bdate"/>
26     <ConstantValue>1994-01-20</ConstantValue>
27   </AttributePredicate>
28
29 </PresentationPolicy>
30 </PresentationPolicyAlternatives>
```




# Presentation token

```
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2
3 <PresentationToken xmlns="http://abc4trust.eu/wp2/abcschemav1.0"
4   xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
5   xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
6   xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc"
7   xsi:schemaLocation="http://abc4trust.eu/wp2/abcschemav1.0 schema.xsd"
8   Version="1.0">
9
10  <PresentationTokenDescription PolicyUID="policy1" EnforceSameUserBinding="true"
11  EnforceSameDeviceBinding="false">
12    <Message>
13      <Nonce>aDk3UEMzOTNjOTl1cmZHQ210U0c=</Nonce>
14    </Message>
15    <Pseudonym Alias="nym" Scope="http://sweden.gov/poll0105" Exclusive="true">
16      <PseudonymValue>MER2VXpyR0Va0W51YXdVNHRISHI=</PseudonymValue>
17    </Pseudonym>
18    <Credential Alias="id">
19      <CredentialSpecUID>urn:sweden:id</CredentialSpecUID>
20      <IssuerParametersUID>urn:sweden:id:issuer</IssuerParametersUID>
21      <DisclosedAttribute AttributeType="urn:sweden:id:city">
22        <AttributeValue>Söderhamn</AttributeValue>
23      </DisclosedAttribute>
24    </Credential>
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26      <Attribute CredentialAlias="id" AttributeType="urn:sweden:id:bdate"/>
27      <ConstantValue>1994-01-20</ConstantValue>
28    </AttributePredicate>
29  </PresentationTokenDescription>
30  <CryptoEvidence> ... </CryptoEvidence>
31
32 </PresentationToken>
```

# The ABC4Trust Architecture Elements


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# ABC4Trust architecture components - high-level view



- All mechanism-agnostic components of Privacy-ABC systems included

# ABC-Engine Components



# Legal considerations for the ABC4Trust architecture



To limit processing to necessary data is supported by Privacy-ABCs:

- **Selective disclosure** of attribute-values out of a certificate and
- **Inspection** allowing conditional disclosure of data once this is really necessary.

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# General Challenges & Potential Identity Management

- Considering
  - the views of the respective stakeholders (Multilateral Security)
  - separations of domains that had been natural “before”
- Enabling users to manage their identities and IDs
- Frameworks and reference architectures
  - Along the value chain (with appropriate incentives)
  - For business processes and applications
  - For new communities and networks
- Globally standardized (e.g. in ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27/WG 5 “Identity Management and Privacy Technologies”)

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# Principles for designing Assurance Tokens


- Enabling the assurance token holder to influence
  - character and degree of identification and
  - amount of identification information
- Enabling communication
  - between assurance token holder and assurance token
- Enabling the assurance token to protect itself:
  - Ability to verify the controller by e.g. extra channel
  - A portfolio of communication mechanisms for redundancy
  - Sufficient access control towards relevant data (which platform?)
  - Enough processing power for complex operations

# Smartphones vs. Smartcards as Assurance Tokens

- Better Usability
  - Credential selection
  - Security advisor
- More processing power
- More Communication Channels
  - Can be used for authentication/check of context (e.g. reader, time, certificates)
- Secure Storage?
- Trusted Environment?
  - Trusted User Interface
  - Trusted Platform ?



# Secure Equipment (20<sup>th</sup> century): Avoiding Threats from Trojan Horses




Wallet with  
private key and  
signature function

# Personal Terminals (early 21<sup>st</sup> century)

## A popular vision: Personal Security Assistants

- Storing personal data
  - Addresses, calendars
  - Money, keys
  - Preferences, ...
- Performs sensitive processes
  - Decoding of confidential messages
  - Signature creation
  - Contract confirmation
- Assists negotiations
  - Documents which are accepted by other parties
  - Methods of payment
  - Reachability



# Challenges for Personal Terminals

- Usability
  - Portability
  - Good visibility of important information (“new network“)
  - Adequate representation of the functionality
- Protection from
  - Unauthorized access to stored data
  - Manipulation of the functionality (e.g. “Trojan Horses”)
  - Denial-of-Service attacks
- Trust (of non-experts)
  - Does the equipment what it shall do?
  - How (much) can I trust it?

# Personal Security Assistants Platforms?

- Personal digital assistants
- Watches
- Mobile phones
- Smartphones
- Tablets
- ...



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# Conclusions & Outlook

- ICT and related services are coming ever closer to people.
- A more privacy friendly Internet requires:
  - Partial Identities and Identifiers
  - Minimum Disclosure
  - Attribute Based Credentials
  - Strong Sovereign Assurance Tokens (smart cards, mobile devices?)

- Kai.Rannenberg@m-chair.net

- [www.m-chair.net](http://www.m-chair.net)

- [www.abc4trust.net](http://www.abc4trust.net)

- [www.fidis.net](http://www.fidis.net)

- [www.primelife.eu](http://www.primelife.eu)

- [www.prime-project.eu](http://www.prime-project.eu)

- [www.picos-project.eu](http://www.picos-project.eu)





- Back-Up



# Identity Theft (?)

